The European Commission by Kassim, Hussein




Novel in both design and function, the European Commission occupies a central position in 
the political system of the European Union (EU). Compared to other international 
administrations in other international organizations, its responsibilities are extensive. The 
Commission is the principal source of EU legislative initiatives. It manages EU policy and 
processes, monitors the implementation of EU law, and negotiates trade agreements on the 
EU’s behalf. Though often decried as an “unelected bureaucracy,” the Commission is in fact 
a hybrid body. Whereas the services of the Commission form a permanent administration, 
the College, headed by the Commission president, is political. Members of the College, 
including the president, are appointed by the governments of the member states and 
elected by the European Parliament every five years, following popular elections to the 
latter body. 
 
The internal functioning of the Commission has attracted considerable interest, particularly 
among scholars of public administration and comparative politics. With respect to the 
Commission’s functioning within the wider EU system, the main debates relate to the role of 
the institution in the EU’s development; the extent of its influence over policy; its executive 
responsibilities and interaction with agencies at EU and national levels; and, in the context 
of a wider discussion of the EU’s democratic credentials, the Commission’s accountability. 
Few dispute the Commission importance, but there is considerable disagreement on how 
the Commission’s role in integration should be theorized and how the Commission as a 
body should be conceptualized. 
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The European Commission has been an object of enduring fascination. The responsibilities 
entrusted to it under the founding treaties involve the Commission in all areas and at 
virtually every stage of EU decision-making. More than an international secretariat but less 
than a government, it has attracted considerable and sustained attention in virtue of its 
institutional novelty, centrality to the EU, and influence within and beyond the borders of 
the Union. Of all EU institutions, the Commission is most often treated as synonymous with 
“Brussels” or “Europe,” and the one that arouses the most controversy. Conforming to Jean 
Monnet’s conception of an independent arbiter of European interest and declared by 
Walter Hallstein as to be the “most original and unprecedented of institutions,” the 
Commission was, according to Charles de Gaulle, populated by “pretentious technocrats,” 
while a former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd vilified Commission staff as “faceless 
bureaucrats bent on centralization and involvement of every nook and cranny of national 
society.” Political leaders have disagreed over how much power it should have and what 
kind of administration it should be, while scholars have debated how much influence it 
exerts and how it functions, raised questions about its accountability, legitimacy and 
authority, and speculated about the people who work for it. More broadly, in a populist age, 
the perception of the Commission as a remote bureaucracy or an unelected government has 
gained ground among European publics. 
 
Against this background, the purpose of this article is twofold: to provide an overview of the 
Commission as an institution, highlighting both its role within the EU system and describing 
its characteristics as an administration; and to offer a critical overview of debates 
concerning the Commission in the research literature. Although the key books on the 
organization have appeared in waves (Cini, 1996; Coombes, 1970; Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012; 
Georgakakis, 2012, 2017; Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2014; Hooghe, 2001; Kassim et al., 2013; 
Page, 1997; Stevens & Stevens, 2001; Wille, 2013), the scholarship on the Commission is 
now voluminous. It is written from several disciplinary and sub-disciplinary perspectives, 
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including international relations, comparative politics, public administration (Trondal, 2007), 
and sociology, and varies in approach, method, and technique. 
 
The discussion that follows is organized into three parts. The first describes the aims of the 
treaty signatories in their design of the Commission, outlines the Commission’s functions 
and responsibilities, and summarizes the changes the Commission has experienced. The 
second section focuses on the Commission as an administration. It examines the structure, 
organization, and operation of the Commission, as well as its personnel policy and the 
people who work for it. The third places the Commission within the wider EU system. It 
considers how the Commission’s role in decision-making, as well as its relationship with 
other institutions and actors in the EU system, has been theorized, conceptualized, and 
investigated. 
 
Origins and Responsibilities 
The Commission was created under the 1957 Treaty of Rome as the executive body of the 
European Economic Community, one of the three original European Communities. Its 
counterparts were the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
established by the Treaty of Paris, 1951, and the Commission of the European Atomic 
Energy Community, created by the EURATOM Treaty, 1957. The three executives were 
merged in 1967 to form the Commission of the European Communities (see Laursen, 2019). 
In the powers and responsibilities that they vested in these executive bodies, the signatories 
departed from the traditional design of international bodies. International organizations are 
typically intergovernmental. Ultimate decision-making authority is exercised by a body 
composed of senior representatives of the member countries, governments are subject only 
to decisions that they support, and the international administration—typically, an 
international secretariat—although permanent, is a subordinate body, with limited 
functions, responsibilities, and influence. In the case of the Communities, the framers gave 
the permanent institutions roles that ensured their centrality in the operation and 
development of the organization, and the authority to carry out their responsibilities 
independently of the member states. 
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The supranationality of the three executive bodies differentiated them from other 
international administrations and distinguishes the three original Communities from other 
international organizations (see Bauer & Knill, 2016; Rittberger & Zangl, 2012; Siotis, 1964). 
The framers were particularly concerned that the Communities should avoid the pathologies 
of the traditional intergovernmental model. Their design was intended to ensure that the 
ambitions set out in the treaty were realized, that governments would not (be allowed to) 
defect from their obligations, and that the Communities would not become enmired by 
national differences or fall victim to the national veto. 
 
There were significant differences between the executives, however. Although the framers 
of the Paris Treaty had conceived the High Authority as an incipient government, their 
ambitions for the Commission of the European Economic Community were more modest. 
Drawing on the experience of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in action and 
learning from the defeat of the European Defence Community and the European Political 
Community, the Commission was granted few direct powers. In addition, whereas the ECSC 
had outlined specific policies that were to be implemented in coal and steel, the Rome 
Treaty was a “framework treaty” (Noel, cited in Dumoulin, 2007), which defined goals and 
objectives, but left to the institutions the work of deciding and adopting policies. 
The four responsibilities vested in the Commission nonetheless gave it a central role. First, it 
was granted a monopoly over policy initiation. All decisions were based on a Commission 
proposal, which led to the description of it by commentators as the “motor of integration.” 
Second, it was the Community’s executive body, responsible for the management and 
implementation of EU policies. Third, the Commission was “guardian of the treaties,” 
responsible for monitoring compliance with EU rules and taking action where it was 
suspected that governments and others failed to meet their obligations under EU law. Its 
fourth function was to represent the Community in external economic relations, including 
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
These core responsibilities have remained more or less unchanged since the late 1950s, 
although the Commission has had continually to adapt to new demands and an ever-
changing environment. With successive waves of enlargement that increased the number of 
EU’s members from 6 to nearly 30, and the broadening of the EU’s competencies, the 
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Commission has become a larger and more complex organization. From a staff of 5,273 in 
1970, it had grown to 7,813 in 1975; to 10,429 in 1985; to 15,568 in 1995; and to around 
32,000 in 2019 (European Commission, 2019). 
 
The EU system has also changed very significantly since the early 1960s. Processes such as 
the consolidation of the Council of the European Union, the emergence of the European 
Council (Puetter, 2014), the strengthening of the European Parliament (Rittberger, 2005), 
and the multiplication of European agencies (Chamon, 2006), whether the result of formal 
treaty change, secondary legislation, or institutional assertion, have increased the EU’s 
institutional and organizational complexity. They have also altered the Commission’s status, 
powers, and terms of interaction with other actors. Some have argued that the Commission 
has declined in consequence (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Johnston, 1994; Kassim & Menon, 
2010), although this view has been contested (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016). 
 
Finally, the Commission has enacted two important administrative reforms. The so-called 
“Kinnock reforms,” implemented between 1999 and 2004, were applied in the wake of the 
resignation of the Santer Commission amid allegations of corruption and nepotism leveled 
at the Commission and following the subsequent commitment on the part of the incoming 
Commission president to modernize the organization. The reforms were the most 
comprehensive undertaken by the Commission and included the creation of a central 
planning and programming apparatus, a far-reaching staff reform, and an overhaul of 
financial management and control procedures (Bauer, 2008b; Kassim, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; 
Kassim et al., 2013; Levy, 2004; Schön-Quinlivan, 2011; Stevens & Stevens, 2001). The 2014 
reform, applied under the conditions of austerity that followed the financial and economic 
crisis, were narrower in scope. However, as well as changes in entitlements and conditions, 
they included a wage freeze and a year-on-year staff reduction (Connolly & Kassim, 2015a; 
European Court of Auditors 2019). 
 
Inside the Commission 
The organization of the Commission further distinguishes it from international secretariats. 
The Commission is a hybrid, combining a political body, the College, which leads the 
organization and an administration, the “services,” which are responsible for technical, 
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preparatory, and support work. Although each College is in office for a fixed term (initially, 
four years but since 1995, five years), the workforce in the services is composed 
predominantly of permanent civil servants. 
 
The College 
The Treaty sets out the rules governing the composition of the College and specifies the 
method by which its members are appointed. It also requires commissioners to be 
independent, which is symbolized by their commitment as part of the oath they make, on 
taking office, “neither to seek nor to take instructions from any Government or from any 
other institution, body, office or entity.” The College is composed of one commissioner per 
member state, each of whom is assisted by a private office or cabinet. To symbolize that the 
College represented the general interests of the EU (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2005), the 
Commission’s first president, Walter Hallstein, determined that decisions should be taken 
collectively at a weekly meeting devoted to that purpose. The Wednesday meetings of the 
College set the rhythm for the work of the Commission (Tholoniat, 2009) and inform the 
organization of its supporting structures—the Monday meeting of chefs de cabinet and the 
meetings of sectoral experts from the cabinets (the so-called, “special chefs”) held where 
necessary in the preceding week, to consider issues that cannot be reconciled at a technical 
level. 
 
The rules and procedures governing the composition of the College and its appointment 
have developed significantly since the Treaty of Rome. Three changes are particularly 
noteworthy. First, the Treaty of the European Union increased the term served by the 
College from four to five years in order to align it with the electoral cycle of the European 
Parliament and thereby strengthen the Commission’s accountability to the Parliament. 
Second, the entitlement of larger member states to each appoint two commissioners, and 
of the smaller states each to appoint one, grew increasingly unsustainable as the College 
became large and unwieldy (Spierenburg, 1979). With further accessions on the horizon, 
governments agreed to include a stipulation in the Nice Treaty that once the number of 
Commissioners reached 27, the size of the subsequent College would be reduced to below 
27. However, because a decision on what formula to implement proved elusive, 
governments agreed as a transitional measure that the larger member countries would each 
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give up their second commissioner. This provision took effect in the first Barroso 
Commission. 
 
Third, commissioners were initially appointed by the common accord of the member states’ 
governments, who also decided the allocation of portfolio responsibilities. The selection 
procedure for the Commission president was originally similar to that of other members of 
the College. The only difference was that governments reviewed and could reselect the 
Commission president midway through the College’s four-year term. Since the Treaty of 
European Union, however, the procedure for choosing the Commission president has been 
gradually separated from the selection of other members of the College. Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, the candidate Commission president is selected by 
the European Parliament and European Council following elections to the European 
Parliament (Christiansen, 2016). If confirmed, he or she then chooses members of the 
Commission from the nominees put forward by national capitals. The political standing of 
the individual concerned—the strength of his or her mandate, former positions held, and 
political experience—as well as the willingness of member governments to accept a steer, 
nominate more than one candidate, or put forward another name when the first is refused 
determines in practice how much discretion the Commission president-elect can exercise 
over the composition of his or her team. 
 
Though distinct processes, the election of the Commission president and the appointment 
of commissioners have been both parliamentarianized and presidentialized. The process of 
parliamentarianization began when the Treaty of European Union gave the European 
Parliament the right to be consulted on the appointment of the president and the authority 
to approve the College en bloc. The Parliament took advantage of the latter provision by 
inserting in its rules of procedure the requirement for hearings of the commissioners-
designate that were modeled on the “confirmation hearings” held by the U.S. Congress on 
presidential nominations to judicial and executive posts. The Parliament has used this 
power to secure changes to the composition of the College. In 2019, for example, it vetoed 
the original nominees put forward by the French, Hungarian, and Romanian governments. 
The powers of the Parliament were extended by first by the Amsterdam Treaty, which gave 
Parliament the right to approve the member states’ nominee for Commission president. 
 8 
When the Nice Treaty granted the European Council the power to nominate the 
Commission president, the Parliament retained the same right of approval. The Treaty of 
Lisbon gave Parliament the authority to elect the president of the Commission on the basis 
of a proposal from the European Council that takes into account the results of European 
Parliamentary elections. This provision was the basis for the Spitzenkandidaten process, 
where a number of the major European parties, backed by the European Parliament (EP), 
agreed in the interests of enhancing the Commission’s democratic legitimacy that the 
candidate of the party that won the 2014 European elections should become the 
Commission president (Christiansen, 2016; Westlake, 2016). Five of the EP’s main party 
families—the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European People’s Party (EPP), the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe (ALDE), the Party of the European Left, and the 
European Green Party—each duly selected, either via a primary or another procedure, a 
candidate who featured prominently in their campaigns. Following the elections, the parties 
insisted that, because the EPP had won more votes than any other party, they would veto 
any nomination by the European Council other than Jean-Claude Juncker, the EPP’s chosen 
candidate (Kassim & Laffan, 2019). The European Council, which had been opposed to the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, insisting that the power to nominate the Commission president 
lay with heads of state and government, backed down in the face of considerable pressure. 
It voted by qualified majority to appoint Juncker as Commission president. Juncker then 
faced another vote before the European Parliament, which he won, and thereby he became 
Commission president. Despite strong support for the Spitzenkandidaten process in the EP, 
Manfred Weber was not put forward as its nominee in 2019, even though he had been the 
lead candidate of the political family—the EPP—that finished ahead in the polls. On this 
evidence, the European Council appears to have wrested back its power. 
 
The appointment of commissioners has also been presidentialized—one of several ways in 
which the Commission presidency has been strengthened (Kassim, 2012). Before the Santer 
administration (1995–1999), the Commission president had virtually no influence on the 
selection of commissioners or the allocation of portfolios (Delors, 2004;Tugenhadt, 1986). 
Since Maastricht, that has changed. The Treaty of European Union required governments to 
nominate other members of the Commission “in consultation with” the nominee for 
Commission president, which the Amsterdam Treaty changed to “by common accord.” 
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Under the Nice Treaty, the Commission president acquired the power not only to reshuffle 
individual commissioners but to oblige them to resign. The Lisbon Treaty retained these 
powers. Although these changes mark a significant strengthening of the powers of the 
Commission president, it is important to underline that member states alone decide who to 
nominate; hence, Barroso’s complaint that the Commission president has a “blind date” 
with the individuals chosen by national capitals. 
 
The Services 
The Commission administration is organized into departments or directorates-general 
(DGs), each of which is headed by a director general. DGs are further subdivided into 
directorates, and divisions or units, headed, respectively, by a director and a head of unit. 
The services have grown considerably since the first Commission, which was composed of 
nine directorates-general, an executive secretariat, and three joint services that the 
Commission shared with the High Authority and the Euratom Commission. Under the 
Juncker Commission (2014–2019), the departments included 34 directorates-general and 12 
services. Most have responsibilities for policy areas, such as trade, fisheries, and transport. 
Others have horizontal or support responsibilities. Among the services, the Secretariat-
General has always been primus inter pares on account of its coordinating role and record-
keeping responsibilities (Kassim, 2006). Seen traditionally as the guardian of collegiality, the 
Secretariat-General ensured that internal procedures were followed and all departments 
consulted. It was also regarded as the representative of the permanent administration to 
the political level (Kassim et al., 2013) 
 
The Commission services are staffed by a career civil service, and in the continental tradition 
the conditions of service are codified in the Staff Regulations (or “Statut”). Recruitment is 
through an external competition, mainly at entry level, with the expectation of progression 
up the scale over the course of a career. Originally, staff were recruited into four categories, 
depending on their level of education, but in 2004 the Kinnock reforms introduced a new 
scale, which separated staff into ADs (administrators) and ASTs (assistants), and a more 
recent reform introduced a clerical AST category, SC (Connolly & Kassim, 2015b). Both ADs 
and ASTs are officials, although in the literature the term “officials” is sometimes used 
(mistakenly) as a synonym for ADs. The permanency of its personnel distinguishes the 
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Commission from most international administrations, and its creation ran contrary to 
preferences of de Gaulle and others who had wanted the Commission to be made up of 
national civil servants seconded on fixed-term contracts (Seidel, 2010). Hallstein (1965) had 
insisted, however, that only as “une grande administration” would it be able to rival 
national bureaucracies and command the respect necessary to carry out the functions that 
it had been entrusted under the founding treaties. 
 
The principle of permanence has, however, been compromised in two ways. The first is by 
the demands of nationality. The Commission needs to ensure that it has within its workforce 
the expertise, skills, and experience necessary to carry out its functions, as well as to 
possess legitimacy as a representative bureaucracy in the eyes of EU citizens (Murdoch, 
Connolly, & Kassim, 2018). The Commission is therefore committed to the principle of 
“geographical balance,” whereby staff are drawn from all the member states (European 
Commission, 2018). It also requires that staff be recruited at all levels from the incoming 
member states with each enlargement, which inevitably diminishes the promotion 
prospects of existing staff. Although the member states originally insisted historically that 
their nationals should be present in the Commission administration in rough proportion to 
their share of the EU population, the demand proved impossible to meet in practice for 
rank-and-file positions. It was respected in senior management positions for over four 
decades, however, until the Kinnock reforms prioritized skills and experience over 
nationality as the key criterion for promotion to these positions. 
 
Second, the Commission has had to develop over time a range of temporary staff categories 
to meet short-term needs or requirements for specialist expertise (Stevens & Stevens, 2001) 
(see Table 1). Fixed-term contracts create difficulties for both the organization and 
individuals. For the Commission, there is a continual churn of temporary staff, the 
recruitment and replacement of whom absorbs resources and is disruptive for the affected 
departments, while for the employees themselves there is the frustration of being 
appointed to a post, learning the job, doing it well, but knowing that the opportunities for 
becoming a permanent official are limited. Seeing themselves as guardians of the European 
public service, the staff unions, moreover, have sought to restrict the possibilities for the 
transfer of staff from temporary to permanent status. Yet, temporary staff represent an 
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important and sizeable segment of personnel, as testified by the profiles produced annually 
by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security. 
 
The Internal Operation of the Commission 
Leadership in the Commission, the interaction between and among cabinets and the 
services, and the people who work for the organization have all attracted scholarly 
attention. Several books examine the whole administration (Cini, 1996; Coombes, 1970; 
Dimitrakopoulos, 2004; Kassim et al., 2013; Nugent & Rhinard, 2016; Schön-Quinlivan, 2011; 
Smith, 2004; Spence & Edwards, 2006; Stevens & Stevens, 2001; Wille, 2013). Other studies 
consider particular actors—presidents (Kassim, 2012; van der Harst and Voerman, 2016), 
commissioners (Deckarm, 2017; Joana & Smith, 2004), senior staff (Ellinas & Suleiman, 
2012; Hooghe, 2001), cabinets (Deckarm, 2017; Joana & Smith, 2002), middle managers 
(Bauer, 2008b)—or individuals, notably Jenkins (Ludlow, 2016) and Delors (Drake, 2000; 
Endo, 1999; Ross, 1995). A number discuss informal networks in the Commission 
(Suvarierol, 2007, 2009), and Hartlapp et al. (2014) investigate internal policy making. 
Leadership 
 
The Commission’s political leadership has been a topic of long-standing interest. Despite the 
high visibility of the Commission President and the expectations directed towards its 
incumbent, the powers granted it under the treaty were sparse and commitment to 
collective decision-making added a further constraint. This led one biographer of the former 
European Commission President (1977–1991), Roy Jenkins, to describe it “an impossible job. 
Indeed, . . . hardly . . . a job at all” (Campbell, 1983, p. 181). Only Hallstein (1958–1968) and 
later Jacques Delors (1985–1995), exceptionally, were able to transcend the limitations of 
the office. Whereas Hallstein, the first Commission president, was able to rely on a unique 
sense of common purpose among his colleagues, Delors arrived in Brussels with strong 
backing both from Bonn and Paris, which gave him a mandate and equipped him with far-
reaching personal authority (Grant, 1994; Ross, 1995). 
 
Until the changes enacted first by the Amsterdam Treaty, and especially the Nice Treaty, the 
Commission Presidency was scarcely differentiated from other members of the Commission. 
The office lacked the political resources—an electoral mandate, leadership of a political 
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party, or coalition agreement—from which heads of government typically derive their 
authority. The incumbent originally had no powers of appointment over other members of 
the Commission. The presidency also had few procedural resources. Decisions were taken 
collectively by the College, the president had no special powers over what items to include 
or exclude from the agenda, and, unlike for example British prime minister, he or she could 
not delegate decision-making power to subcommittees of the College and thereby 
circumvent opposition. The Commission president also had limited administrative 
resources. The president’s cabinet was not significantly bigger than other Commissioners. 
Although the Secretariat-General was formally accountable to the president, its 
responsibilities were to the College and Commission as a whole (Kassim, 2006). Moreover, 
the president had little if any personal authority over Commission services. Decisions 
concerning the organization of the Commission were taken by the College as a whole. 
Nor was the College well placed to provide effective leadership. As result of the method by 
which they were selected, Commissioners were rarely united by common political purpose 
or ideological outlook (Coombes, 1970). Nor were members of the Commission subject to 
the same obligations, disciplines or incentives as a government minister. They did not owe 
their appointment to the Commission president nor (until the Nice Treaty) could they be 
dismissed. Relations between Commissioners were competitive as each sought to promote 
his or her own policy agenda in pursuit of personal political success. Unsurprisingly, Colleges 
lacked cohesion, discipline, and the authority to control or coordinate the services. 
A slow process of presidentialization has gradually created a capacity for effective 
leadership. The Presidency has been strengthened by a series of treaty amendments—the 
Treaty of Nice was arguably the key moment—in four ways: (a) by giving the Commission 
president the power to define the Commission’s policy guidelines; (b) by explicitly 
recognizing the Commission president’s pre-eminence within the College; (c) by granting the 
president authority over the organization of the Commission; and (d) by giving the president 
the authority to appoint, dismiss and re-shuffle individual Commissioners. Operationalized 
through the Commission rules of procedure, they have given the Commission presidents 
control over the Commission’s policy and work programs, the weekly agenda of the College, 
and the organization of the Commission services. Previously, these powers had been in the 
collective hands of the College. 
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José Manuel Barroso was the first Commission president to make extensive use of these 
powers (Kassim et al., 2013). Over his two terms of office, the first from 2004 to 2009 and 
the second from 2009 to 2014, he pursued a strongly presidential leadership style. Invoking 
the prerogatives of the office and the need for clear direction following the “big bang” 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, and the rise of Euroscepticism, Barroso decided 
it was for the Commission president to define the Commission’s policy priorities, determine 
what was discussed in College, and put his name to important proposals. To underpin this 
expanded conception of the presidency, Barroso gave the office a new organizational 
resource. By converting the Secretariat-General from its traditional function of serving the 
College as a body into a presidential service, Barroso was able to extend the reach of the 
presidency, and to use the Secretariat-General’s presence at key procedural interstices to 
ensure the promotion of his policy agenda. The planning, monitoring and quality control 
mechanisms created within the Secretariat-General by the Kinnock reforms were harnessed 
to pursue the president’s policy program. 
 
The restructuring of the College undertaken by Commission president Juncker further 
strengthened presidential leadership (Kassim, 2017; Kassim & Laffan, 2019). Juncker was 
not only the first president to be appointed through the Spitzenkandidaten process and 
therefore to be able to claim a personal mandate for his political program, but also the first 
incumbent to have at his disposal the full panoply of powers flowing from the Lisbon Treaty. 
Using the term “political Commission” to highlight his intention to lead an administration 
that would be responsive to the needs of European citizens rather than a remote, 
insensitive technocracy, turn the page on austerity, and operate differently from its 
predecessor, Juncker undertook a series of organizational and procedural reforms, 
introducing “new ways of working,” that were intended to ensure the effective delivery of 
the policy program he set out before the European Parliament in his Political Guidelines 
(Juncker, 2014). 
 
The reorganization of the College was carefully thought through during the transition period 
following Juncker’s election in July 2014, by a team led by Martin Selmayr, who would head 
the President’s cabinet and later become secretary general. The Juncker Commission (2014-
19) was organized around seven vice presidents. Two—the first vice president and the vice 
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president for the Budget and Human Resources—held cross-Commission responsibilities. 
The other five each took the policy lead in a designated field, and for steering the work of 
project teams composed of commissioners with the associated portfolio responsibilities. 
The aim was to strengthen political leadership in an effort to overcome the fragmentation 
that had historically characterized the organization and thereby ensure delivery of the 
Commission president’s 10 policy priorities within the lifetime of the Juncker administration. 
Coordination 
 
The emergence of a strong political and administrative center within the Commission since 
2004 has greatly improved internal coordination, which had historically been highly 
problematic for the organization (Coombes, 1970; Cram, 1994; Kassim et al., 2013; Schön-
Quinlivan, 2010; Spierenburg, 1979). Horizontally, cabinets had been in fierce competition 
with each other, either to promote portfolio or national concerns (Joana & Smith, 2002), 
whereas DGs were perceived as feuding baronies, fiercely fighting to defend their turf. 
Vertically, the relations between the cabinets and the services embodied the classic 
confrontation between political ambition and technical knowledge. 
 
In the absence of a countervailing strong central authority, keeping these relationships in 
check had been a perennial challenge. The cabinets in particular had been viewed as a 
disruptive force within the organization (Donnelly & Ritchie, 1997). Although they provided 
essential support for the Commissioners and served as an important intermediary between 
the political level of the Commission and the administration, they were regarded with 
suspicion by the services, first, because their key members were typically external recruits 
with little experience of the EU, second, because they too often interfered in the technical 
detail of policy, and third, because they were frequently constituted of compatriots of the 
Commissioner and acted as national enclaves promoting the interests of the 
Commissioner’s national capital. Furthermore, towards the end of each mandate, cabinet 
members recruited from outside the organization would be “parachuted” into a middle or 
senior management post, thereby blocking the promotion opportunities of career officials. 
Many of these tensions have now been defused. Rules introduced by the Santer 
Commission and after require that cabinets be multinational in composition, that they 
include Commission officials on secondment as well as external recruits, and that they be 
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gender balanced. There are also restrictions on parachutage. As a result of these changes, 
the cabinets have undergone a process of de-nationalization both in their composition 
(Egeberg & Heskestad, 2010) and in their operation (Kassim et al., 2013). Maintaining the 
relationship with the Commissioner’s capital is no longer perceived as a top priority, for 
example. Although tensions remain—members of cabinets do not believe that the services 
take sufficient account of political considerations, for example, while staff in the DGs do not 
think that the cabinets always treat them with sufficient respect—and the belief persists 




Scholars interested in the people who work for the organization have examined the origins 
of Commission staff, their motivations and beliefs, and the socializing power of the 
Commission. Nationality has been an enduring concern—as a factor in appointments and 
promotions, in shaping the Commission’s administrative culture (Stevens & Stevens, 2001), 
and in determining the extent to which the Commission can be considered a representative 
bureaucracy (Murdoch et al., 2018). The impact of the 2004–2007 enlargements also 
attracted interest, given the need to suddenly introduce staff on an unprecedented scale 
from the acceding 12 member states (Ban, 2013; Kassim et al., 2013, chap. 9). 
 
Early studies were somewhat fragmentary. Michelmann (1978), for example, had focused 
on only two DGs. It was not until the Prodi Commission that the Commission began to 
publish detailed breakdowns of its staff, and only after a further twenty-five years that the 
Commission published its understanding of the “geographical balance” (European 
Commission, 2018). Page (1997) was the first to investigate systematically the number and 
distribution of nationals within the Commission. Using a disproportionality index that 
measured the presence of each member state’s nationals against that country’s share of the 
EU population, he established that the nationals of many smaller member countries—
particularly Belgium for obvious reasons—were over-represented, whereas larger member 
states were under-represented. 
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Two decades after Page’s analysis the underrepresentation of certain member states not 
only persists, as Table 3 shows, but, following the 2004–2007 enlargements when it 
assumed a new salience, has become an issue for the Commission and the countries 
concerned (Connolly & Kassim, 2015a). As well as the cause of a potential shortage of 
expertise, underrepresentation has a democratic dimension. The Commission needs to be 
visibly representative of the populations that it serves and able to communicate with 
European citizens in their mother tongue. There is also an anxiety that underrepresentation 
might be symptomatic of deeper problems. The declining number of U.K. nationals, for 
example, has been interpreted as a warning that low levels of recruitment signal decreasing 
levels of identification with the EU and understanding of it. The Commission has been 
keeping a close eye on the issue (European Commission, 2018). Gunther Oettinger, the 
commissioner responsible for administration in the Juncker Commission, the Directorate-
General for Human Resources, and the European Personnel and Selection Office, together 
with the member states concerned, have been investigating ways to improve recruitment 
from under-represented countries. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
Although nationality has been a perennial scholarly concern, attention has more recently 
been directed at the educational and professional backgrounds of Commission staff 
(Connolly & Kassim, 2015a, 2019; Kassim et al., 2013). Contrary to accepted wisdoms, these 
studies have reported that the Commission is not populated overwhelmingly by lawyers. In 
fact, there are more graduates of economics and of natural science than of law among its 
personnel. Nor is the Commission staffed only by career civil servants, with little experience 
beyond the public sector or outside the Brussels “bubble.” In fact, no fewer than 97% of 
Commission personnel have significant previous work experience, whereas more than 40% 
have been employed in the private sector or the liberal professions (Alayrac, Connolly, & 
Kassim, 2019). 
 
Scholars have also examined the motivations, beliefs, and values of Commission staff. An 
assumption in the early literature was that the staff of EU executive bodies would be 
committed supranationalists (Haas, 1958). Later writers took the view that Commission staff 
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are likely to be Niskanen-style competence maximizers (Hix & Høyland, 2011). A common 
perception, meanwhile, shared by scholars and the wider public alike, is that the 
Commission personnel are likely to be committed federalists. Empirical tests of these views 
suggest, however, there is little evidence to support them. When in her pioneering study 
she investigated the outlook of senior managers and chefs de cabinet, for example, Hooghe 
(2001) found significant variation in the ideals and preferences of staff. These results were 
confirmed in later research based on data from much larger staff samples—1,901 policy 
officers in Kassim et al. (2013) and 5,545 from all staff groupings in Connolly and Kassim 
(2015a, 2015b). These studies report that “building Europe” is an important motivation on 
the part of most staff for deciding to pursue a career in the Commission, but that other 
reasons are also significant and that more employees prefer the “Community method” to a 
federalist vision of the future where the Commission is the government of Europe. 
Moreover, personnel do not necessarily instinctively prefer “more Europe” to “less Europe” 
(Hooghe, 2012). 
 
A related question concerns influence on the values of Commission staff. The debate on 
whether the beliefs held by staff are the result of socialization within the Commission began 
with Hooghe (2005). In this influential article, Hooghe argued that although the beliefs of 
senior staff were aligned with the Commission’s organizational values, those values were 
forged early in life—well before employees entered the Commission and therefore 
independently of it. This “pre-recruitment” thesis, which quickly became the dominant 
wisdom in the literature, was challenged by Trondal (2007). Trondal examined the views of 
seconded national experts, civil servants recruited to the Commission for a fixed term 
before returning to their home administration, and found that their experience in the 
Commission had had an impact on their loyalties. In other words, “post-recruitment” 
experience could shape the outlook of personnel. 
 
More recently, Connolly and Kassim (2016) have revisited the socialization debate. They 
have tested the main hypotheses proposed in the literature, using a dataset drawn from 
Commission respondents in all staff groupings and in several locations. They show for the 
first time that the values of personnel vary between staff categories, thereby underlining 
the danger of grounding generalizations in the experience of a narrow segment or strata of 
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personnel. Moreover, able to assess the effects of a far wider range of variables than the 
earlier literature, they find that staff values are shaped by experiences both before and after 
entering the Commission. Further analysis similarly confirms that the European Commission 
is a socializing environment, which runs counter to the established view in the literature 
that working for an international administration does not significantly affect the values of 
staff (Murdoch, Kassim, Connolly, & Geys, 2019). 
 
Finally, the question of whether an administrative culture exists within the Commission has 
divided scholars. Cram (1993) and Cini (1996) argue for the existence of shared norms and 
loyalties, but suggest that they are greater at departmental level than across the whole 
organization. This position is contested by Abélès, Bellier, and McDonald (1993); Shore 
(2000); and Ellinas and Suleiman (2012), who, for different reasons and writing from 
different perspectives, contend that there is evidence of a Commission-wide culture. 
Meanwhile, Ban (2013), Kassim et al. (2013), and Connolly and Kassim (2015a) take opposite 
views on whether staff from member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 differ in 
their beliefs, values, and outlook from recruits from the EU15. Whereas Ban (2013) finds 
evidence of strong differences, Kassim et al. (2013) and especially Connolly and Kassim 
(2015a) find only a slight variation. Taking a somewhat different approach, Georgakakis 
(2017) argues that the Commission’s administrative culture is in decline and that traditional 
norms have been eroded by managerial change that has effectively normalized the 
Commission. 
 
The Commission in the EU System 
A significant literature also investigates the function and operation of the Commission 
within the wider EU system, where scholars have been particularly concerned to assess the 
Commission’s power and influence. Four debates can usefully be distinguished, even if in 
practice they overlap. The first concerns the Commission’s role in integration. It originates in 
a clash between supporters of the two classic theories, neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, which, with the emergence of new theoretical perspectives in the 
1990s, became a debate between intergovernmentalists and various critics. More recently, 
the Commission’s role has been examined in the context of EU’s experience of crisis. The 
second debate relates to the Commission’s influence as a policy entrepreneur, and the third 
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to the Commission as an executive body. The fourth is normative and concerns the 
Commission in a wider discussion regarding the EU’s democratic credentials. 
The Commission and European Integration 
 
The power of the Commission was first contested in a debate between the two “grand 
theories” of integration—neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism—which dominated 
the EU literature from the 1950s until the 1980s and continues to remain relevant. Since the 
application to the EU of theories of delegation in the mid-1990s, however, the terms of the 
debate have changed. 
 
Neofunctionalism Versus Intergovernmentalism 
Neofunctionalism, originally based on the writings of Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963), saw 
the European Commission as instrumental to European integration. The foundation of the 
Communities as a regional organization was the first step in a process that would become 
self-reinforcing. They posited “functional spillover” as a key mechanism: common action in 
one sector creates pressure to integrate other sectors. The demand for further integrating 
measures would come from domestic actors—elected officials, interest groups, and large 
firms who believed that their interests would be best satisfied at the regional level—but the 
European Commission would play a key role in promoting the transfer of loyalties to the EU 
level as the Communities proved more efficient than states in meeting welfare needs, goal 
articulation, advancing EU policies, and brokering negotiations with member states so as to 
“upgrade the common interest.” 
 
The idea that the Commission could play a leading role in bringing integration about was 
contested by intergovernmentalism, which drew heavily on the realist school in 
international relations. From this perspective, European integration was no different from 
intergovernmental cooperation elsewhere. States could be expected to cooperate for as 
long as it was beneficial. They retained control over decision-making as well as the pace, 
scope, and form of cooperation. Hoffmann (1966) argued that the authority of the 
Commission was limited in scope, conditional on member state approval, reversible, and 
likely to be confined to areas of “low politics.” “High politics” could be expected to remain 
an exclusive preserve of national governments. 
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The terms of the debate changed with the emergence of international regime theory in the 
late 1970s, which reconciled a state-centric conception of the international order with 
recognition that international institutions could carry out functional tasks that were 
beneficial to governments. However, even if he saw the EEC as an international regime, 
Hoffmann (1982) maintained his view that the EEC’s institutions were weak “because they 
lack autonomy (from the member states) and because their capacity to act is small” 
(Hoffman, 1982, p. 32). Writing in the wake of the Single European Act (SEA), Moravcsik 
(1991) also rejected the idea that the Commission could play a central role. Contending that 
integration had proceeded through a sequence of intergovernmental bargains, Moravcsik 
contended that national governments were the key actors in his analysis of the SEA, the 
Treaty of European Union (Moravcsik, 1993), and his history of integration (1998). In a later 
article, Moravcsik (1999) argued that the Commission lacked the resources to exert 
independent influence. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, authors have challenged intergovernmentalist claims that the 
Commission exerted only negligible influence in the Community’s development on empirical 
grounds (see, e.g., Green Cowles, 1995; Ross, 1995; Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989; Schmidt, 
1996) and that it had no influence at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) (Beach & 
Christiansen, 2007). Some authors who had previously attributed minimal influence to the 
Commission recognized that it had played a role (Hoffman & Keohane, 1992). There were 
also more systematic attempts to recast neofunctionalism. Notably, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz (1998) proposed a “ modified neofunctionalism” that emphasized the 
Commission’s capacity to mobilize transnational business and to sway national 
governments. 
 
Theories of Delegation and the Study of the Commission 
The application of insights from the theory of delegation that had been used to investigate 
the delegation of regulatory power from the legislative to the executive branch in the U.S. 
political system brought about a radical change in the study of the Commission. With the 
principal-agent model with which it is strongly associated, the theory of delegation was used 
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mainly by critics of intergovernmentalism to demonstrate the Commission’s capacity for 
independent action (Kassim & Menon, 2003). 
 
The functional theory of delegation holds that it may be beneficial for a “principal” to confer 
responsibilities to an “agent” in order to ensure that certain goals or objectives of the 
principal are realized. In the political world, a principal may decide to delegate for the 
following reasons: 
- To overcome problems of collective action, where actors anticipate benefits from co-
operation but want to ensure that the contract is respected by other parties 
- To deal with the problem of “incomplete contracting,” by empowering an agent to 
fill in the details of a framework agreement and adjudicate future disputes 
- To reduce information asymmetries and improve the quality of policy in technical 
areas where an agent has specialist expertise 
- To demonstrate the credibility of commitment 
- To displace responsibility for unpopular decisions; 
- To “lock in” distributional benefits that particular institutional arrangements are 
likely to deliver 
- To resolve the problem of policymaking instability and thereby avoid the problem of 
policy “cycling” that besets systems of majoritarian decision-making (Riker, 1980) 
At the same time, delegation can lead to problems that the principal-agent model 
highlights. The agent benefits from asymmetric information, so can engage in opportunistic 
behavior—shirking—that is costly to the principal, but difficult to detect. The likelihood of 
shirking is increased by slippage, when the structure of delegation “provides incentives for 
the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the principal” (Pollack, 1997, 
p. 108). 
 
The “principal’s problem” (Ross, 1973) is to design control mechanisms that limit the 
possibilities for shirking, slippage, and drift, but that do not outweigh the benefits derived 
from delegation, and that allow the agent sufficient discretion in carrying out the delegated 
tasks. Here the literature distinguishes between monitoring strategies that are continuous, 
but costly—“police patrols”—and “fire alarms” that are discontinuous and less costly, but 
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depend on the action of third parties. Principals can also impose sanctions, ex ante or ex 
post. 
 
Writing from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism, Pollack (1996, 1997, 2003) 
pioneered the application of the approach to the EU. He argues first that the member states 
benefit from the delegation to the Commission of responsibility for policy initiation (agenda-
setting power), monitoring compliance and enforcing treaty provisions (guardian of the 
treaties), and incomplete contracting and regulatory power (executive responsibilities). He 
also evaluates the control mechanisms and sanctions available to the member states. He 
argues that comitology as a “police patrol” mechanism is effective, but costly, while “fire 
alarms” in the form of checks on the Commission’s activities by other EU institutions work 
well. Sanctions, by contrast (budgetary costs, appointments and re-appointments, and new 
Council legislation) are not very effective. They are either too difficult to mobilize because 
they require a high level of agreement among the member states or, in the case of re-
contracting (i.e., revising the Commission’s mandate), a nuclear option and therefore not 
credible. 
 
Pollack concludes that the Commission’s autonomy is shaped by four factors: the 
distribution of preferences among member states and the Commission; decision rules for 
applying sanctions, overruling legislation, and changing agents’ mandates; incomplete 
information and uncertainty in the principal-agent relationship; and the presence of 
constituencies within the member states (subnational institutions, interest groups, or 
individuals), which can bypass member governments or place pressure on them. 
Other authors working within the same school (e.g., Tallberg, 2002, 2007) have used the 
theory of delegation and principal-agent to explain the delegation of responsibilities and 
powers to the Commission, as well as the Commission’s capacity to influence decision-
making. Franchino (2002, 2004), by contrast, uses the approach to explain the choices made 
by the Council in the delegation to the Commission in secondary legislation. Focusing on 
implementation powers, he finds that the variation in delegation and discretion depend on 
the level of conflict in Council, the decision rule in operation, the degree of conflict between 
Council and Commission, and the complexity of policy area. 
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In his examination of the relationship between member governments and the Commission, 
written from the perspective of historical institutionalism, Pierson (1996) does not use the 
terminology of principal-agent, but does draw on its reasoning. Member governments, he 
argues, have strong incentives to delegate authority to the Commission. They may not 
intend the Commission to become autonomous, but for several reasons (the complexity of 
EU processes, asymmetric information that favors the Commission, interaction effects, 
change in member state preferences, and resistance on the part of the Commission)—
unintended consequences—it becomes increasingly difficult over time for them to maintain 
their control. With the sunk costs that national capitals have incurred, the rising price of exit 
they face, as well as the high institutional barriers to reform, it becomes increasingly 
difficult once gaps in control have emerged for them to assert themselves. 
 
Finally, in their articulation of the multilevel governance approach, Marks, Hooghe, and 
Blank (1996) refer to the theory of delegation and use the language of principal-agent to 
emphasize that the state-centric view of the EU is outdated. In their critique of 
intergovernmentalism, the authors highlight the difficulty faced by multiple principals with 
differing preferences, impediments to coherent principal action, informational asymmetries 
between principals and agents, and the unintended consequences of institutional change as 
important constraints on the ability of national governments to maintain control over the 
Commission. 
 
The European Commission, the Eurozone Crisis and Beyond 
The most recent iteration of the debate on the Commission’s role in European integration 
relates to the prolonged period of crisis experienced by the EU since the results of 
referendums on treaty reform in the Netherlands and France in 2005. The rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty by votes in two of the six founder member states was followed by 
overlapping crises concerning sovereign debt in the eurozone, the influx of refugees 
displaced by conflict on the Union’s periphery, the rise of Eurosceptic populism, including 
Brexit, the emergence of illiberal democracy within the EU, and new and renewed 
geopolitical threats. In terms which have often echoed the earlier clash between 
intergovernmentalist and supranationalist accounts of integration, scholars have sought to 
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examine which EU institution took the lead role in determining the EU’s response and assess 
the impact of the crisis on the powers and authority of the respective institutions. 
After an initial focus on the European Council (see, e.g., Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015; 
Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2016; De Schoutheete, 2012; Fabbrini, 2015; Puetter, 2014), which it 
was thought, because of the seniority of its membership, was the only institution that had 
the authority to address issues of such magnitude, authors have highlighted the influence of 
supranational factors, including agency on the part of the European Commission and, in the 
case of the eurozone crisis, the Central European Bank (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2018; 
Dehousse, 2016; Kassim & Tholoniat, 2020; Schimmelfennig, 2018). A number have argued 
that, despite the importance, even centrality, of the European Council, the European 
Commission has emerged as a “winner” of the crisis (Bauer & Becker, 2014). 
 
Discussion of the crises has also prompted extended reflection on the EU’s longer-term 
development and the changing institutional balance. Particularly influential in this regard 
has been the work of Fabbrini and Puetter (2016). Reviewing the EU’s evolution since the 
Maastricht Treaty, they highlight the continued preparedness of the member states, on the 
one hand, to expand competencies into new and sensitive areas of what Hoffmann one 
called “high politics,” notably foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, and 
macroeconomic policy. On the other hand, they note that delegation has been contingent 
on reserving decision-making power to intergovernmental forums—either the Council of the 
European Union or the European Council. There have been few instances of a willingness to 
extend to replicate the Commission’s role in policy initiation in these new fields. As a result, 
although the “Community method,” in which the Commission plays a pivotal role, survives 
in relation to the common market, a new mode of intergovernmentalism has been created 
in areas added since Maastricht. The result is a system of dual governance. 
 
The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur 
In the wake of the SEA, with its emergence as an authoritative decision-making arena in 
many areas of economist activity, the EU came increasingly to be conceptualized as a polity 
rather than an international organization. With a more detailed focus on the policy process, 
the impact of new legislative procedures and decision rules, and the Commission’s 
reinvigorated role, scholars directed their attention to the Commission’s resources and 
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assessing its influence on the EU’s decisional outputs within a complex institutional setting. 
In their analyses, they applied theories, models, and concepts from comparative politics and 
public policy (Hix, 1994, though see Hurrell & Menon, 1996). 
 
In the early 1990s, a number of path-breaking empirical studies examined policy 
development at the sector level and revealed the extent to which the Commission had 
acted as a policy entrepreneur. Scholars drew attention to the Commission’s resources as a 
“process manager” (Eichener, 1992), underlined the informational advantages it possessed 
(Marks et al., 1996), and offered insights into the Commission’s modus operandi as a 
“purposeful opportunist” (Cram, 1993). They also highlighted the influence exercised by the 
Commission exercise in virtue of its ability to propose and frame legislation, set the policy 
agenda, and shape to a high degree the content of final text adopted by the Council. 
The Single European Act and the 1992 project also generated a theoretical debate about the 
respective influence of the main EU institutions in the legislative process. Pollack’s 
conceptualization of the European Commission as an agenda setter was an important, 
pioneering contribution. In her seminal 2000 article, Susanne Schmidt showed that the 
Commission’s influence derived not only from its ability to decide which proposals to put on 
the table and when, but from its special prerogatives in competition policy and its right 
under the treaties to initiate legal action in order to ensure that actors, public and private, 
complied with their obligations under EU law. 
 
Schmidt identified two specific strategies available to the Commission to overcome member 
state reluctance or opposition in the Council, and thereby to ensure legislative action on the 
part of the EU. The Commission could “divide and conquer” by transforming the policy 
preferences of states opposed to liberalization by using its competition policy prerogatives 
to force domestic change in those countries, thereby exposing them to the danger of being 
disadvantaged if they failed to acquiesce; or it could use the threat of litigation to confront 
reluctant member states with a choice between the “lesser evil” of controlled reform or the 
unpredictable path of legislation by judicial fiat. 
 
More generally, as the legislative procedures of the EU have developed and redistributed 
power among key actors, scholars have sought to measure and assess the influence of EU 
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institutions. The main interest has lain in evaluating the impact of procedural reforms 
introduced by successive treaty changes, particularly on the European Parliament, and 
especially the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council of the European Union. The 
landmark work was undertaken by Crombez (1996, 1997) and by Tsebelis alone (1994) or 
with co-authors (Tsebelis & Garrett, 1997, 2000). The spatial models developed by these 
authors focused mainly on the European Parliament and the conditions under which it could 
exert influence over legislation. Despite the preoccupation with “bicameral politics” in the 
“EU’s legislature,” the Commission’s (conditional) agenda-setting power also featured in 
these models. 
 
More recently, legislative specialists have directed their attention to the Commission’s 
influence, and specifically how the Commission has been affected by changes to co-decision. 
The consensus among these scholars is that the Commission’s power has been significantly 
diminished, particularly as a consequence of the growing number of agreements between 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union at first reading (Burns, 
2004; Costello & Thomsen, 2013; Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2011). Gardner (2013), 
meanwhile, has explored how the Commission’s use of its ability to withdraw proposals also 
allows it to shape the EU’s policy agenda. 
 
An important sub-literature has also developed on the pre-legislative phase of law making. 
The relationship between the Commission and interest groups and other lobbyists has 
always attracted scholarly interest, but recently authors have taken a new and more 
sophisticated approach to the interaction. While Dür, Bernhagen, and Marshall (2015) have 
examined whether some types of interest group are more successful than others, van 
Ballaert (2017) has approached the relationship from the side of the Commission and 
investigated what factors account for the selection of consultation procedures it uses. 
 
The Commission as an Executive 
In the understanding of the EU as a polity, the Commission has come routinely to be 
conceptualized as part of the EU’s executive. Despite broad agreement that executive 
functions in the EU are shared between EU-level institutions on the one hand (though see 
Majone, 2002a), and the member states, who are responsible for the implementation of 
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policy through their national administrations (Kassim, 2014), on the other, debate continues 
as to which EU institutions—other than the Commission and EU agencies—make up the EU 
component of the executive (see Kreppel, 2011; Tallberg, 2007). Irrespective of how that 
question is answered, the executive frame usefully highlights the Commission’s interaction 
with other actors in its management and implementation roles. 
 
Comitology 
In the EU, as in other political systems, the legislature routinely delegates responsibility for 
detailing how individual items of legislation are to be implemented to the executive. In the 
EU’s case, committees composed of representatives from the member states, with varying 
powers, exercise oversight over the Commission as it carries out this responsibility. This 
comitology system has its origins in the common agricultural policy from which it expanded 
ad hoc into other areas. It was standardized following the SEA by a Council decision in July 
1987, reformed by the same in June 1999, then again in July 2006, and overhauled following 
the Lisbon Treaty by a Regulation of the Council and Parliament in 2011 (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2011). 
 
As well as granting the European Parliament—a long-term critic of comitology—a general 
right to receive information about committee decisions and to scrutinize proposed 
measures for ultra vires, the new system introduced a major simplification by reducing the 
number of committee procedures from four to two. Under the examination procedure, 
which is intended for measures with broad scope and potentially far-reaching impact, the 
Commission’s proposed measure can be rejected by a qualified majority against (negative 
vote) or adopted where a qualified majority is in favor of the Commission’s proposed 
measure (positive vote). Where there is no qualified majority either way, the Commission 
can decide whether to implement the proposed measure or submit a new version to the 
committee. Under the advisory procedure, the Commission can decide whether or not to 
implement the proposed measure, but must take “utmost account” of the committee’s 
opinion. 
 
Scholars have focused on the positions taken by the Commission and Council over which 
procedure should be included. Dogan (1997, 2002 found that the institutions did not 
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necessarily support procedures that strengthened their hand. For example, despite 
protestations by the Commission about the Council’s reluctance to accept the advisory 
procedure, the Council agreed to its adoption under 40 Commission proposals between 
1987 and 1995. However, Hix and Høyland (2011) suggest that this may reflect that the 
Commission only proposes the advisory procedure when it thinks the Council might accept. 
Comitology has also been cited as an example of non-hierarchical and deliberative policy 
style (Joerges & Neyer, 1997) in the face of intergovernmentalist claims that interaction 
between national representatives takes the form of hard bargaining. 
 
EU Agencies 
The emergence and proliferation of EU agencies—from 2 to more than 40 between 1990 
and 2015—was a development to which the Commission was initially opposed, first, 
because it was concerned about the dispersal of power and resources, and second, because 
it believed that the principle that the treaty had reserved executive responsibilities to the 
Commission alone had been supported by the Court of Justice of the European Union—the 
so-called “Meroni doctrine.” However, by the time of the Prodi Commission (1999–2004), 
the Commission had come to recognize the benefits that EU agencies afforded—the high 
profile generated by the tasks assigned to them, their technical knowledge, their role in 
pooling national and European expertise, and their relieving the Commission of 
administrative tasks, so allowing it to concentrate on political decisions. 
 
Although the literature has been mainly preoccupied with the origins of agencies (see, e.g., 
Barbieri & Ongaro, 2008; Busuioc, Groenleer, & Trondal, 2012; Dehousse, 1997; Kreher, 
1997; Verhoest, van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012), some authors have examined the 
relationship between EU agencies and the Commission. It had been assumed that agencies 
would be self-interested, hostile to the Commission, and unlikely to cooperate. Egeberg and 
Trondal (2011) sought to test this view empirically. They found from responses to surveys 
that they administered within EU agencies that staff consider the Commission a partner and 





National Administrations, Agencies, and Networks 
The EU’s reliance on national bodies for the coherent and effective implementation of EU 
legislation presents the Commission with a formidable challenge. Although the Commission 
has overall responsibility for the enforcement of EU rules, its small size and distance from 
the front line impose significant constraints. Particularly since the SEA—a watershed 
moment, as the single internal market could not be achieved if the uneven implementation 
of legislation were allowed to create barriers to trade, but where the Commission was 
largely untested (Metcalfe, 1992)—the Commission has pursued at least four strategies. 
 
First, prioritizing the single market as an area of action, the Commission has used a variety 
of techniques to achieve high levels of implementation. As well as a series of action plans to 
highlight particular areas, it has set year-on-year targets and uses a biannual scoreboard to 
publicize the successes of some member states and to name and shame the laggards. The 
strategy has succeeded in meeting the 0.5% implementation deficit target. 
 
Second, the Commission has sought to delegate non-core functions to EU agencies on a 
programmatic basis. An important element has been to bring coherence and accountability 
to the operation of agencies. Agencies had been created for different purposes and varied in 
responsibility, size, and organization (European Commission, 2008), and their proliferation 
had been disorderly and uncontrolled. In an initiative launched in 2008, the Commission 
sought to increase its effectiveness. Further measures followed in 2012 and 2013, including 
a 2013 communication that set out the staffing level and subsidy of each decentralized 
agency under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014–2020. 
 
Third, Commission departments have formed close relations with the sectoral and sub-
sector networks that bring together national regulatory agencies. This has been the case, for 
example, in broadcasting, with the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities; in energy, 
the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas; in financial services, with the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators, the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions’ Supervisors, and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(Coen & Thatcher, 2008; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). Some of these networks have now been 
superseded by network agencies. 
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Fourth, the Commission has sought to create networks between public authorities. 
Examples include SOLVIT, formed in 2002, to link national authorities and thereby ensure 
that the benefits of the single market can be directly enjoyed by consumers across the EU, 
and the Internal Market Information (IMI) system, which enables national authorities in the 
member states to exchange information. Although they have their limitations, these 
networks have provided an important infrastructural underpinning for the single market. 
 
These initiatives have been assisted by recognition of the benefits of cooperation on the 
part of actors at national and EU level. Studies conducted by Egeberg and Trondal (2009) 
and Ongaro, Barbieri, Belle, and Fedele (2015) show that national agencies view the 
Commission as a partner, not a rival. Second, national governments or departments and 
agencies at the sectoral or sub-sectoral level have responded to incentives to make the 
single market work. Similarly, Heidbreder (2014) has mapped the formation and operation 
of horizontal networks involving national actors in three areas of the single market. The 
scope for institutional autonomy is perhaps diminishing. 
 
In some areas, however, the EU has resorted to legislation to improve enforcement. 
Although member states have a duty to enforce EU rules, compliance and enforcement is 
sometime uneven. In energy, telecommunications, and competition policy, EU legislation 
includes the requirement that national authorities are appropriately resourced to carry out 
their responsibilities (Verhoest et al., 2012). This is the closest to “managing by design” 
(Metcalfe & Richards, 1990) that the Commission has been able to achieve. 
 
The Commission as Part of a Wider Executive 
Some scholars have been keen to look beyond the functions and capacities of the 
Commission as an executive body and have contemplated the Commission as part of a new 
multilevel executive entity that has emerged since the creation of the single internal 
market. The participants in this debate highlight the linkages between the Commission and 
national bodies, and argue that there has been a transformation of public administration 
within the EU. The idea of a “fused administration” (Wessels, 1997), which emphasizes the 
close interaction between the Commission and member state bureaucracies, was perhaps 
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the first conceptualization intended to highlight the emergence of a new executive order 
and to convey its permanence. 
 
Although its influence has persisted, “fusion” has been challenged by several other 
conceptualizations. Most highlight the transformation of national administration as a result 
of agencification and the links that have developed between the Commission and those new 
bodies. Trondal (2010), for example, has argued that an “emergent European executive 
order” has grown up around the Commission, with a parallel administration of EU-level 
agencies and EU committees. 
 
The same relationship is emphasized in the notion of a multilevel administration, proposed 
by Egeberg (2006b). According to the synoposis for the latter volume: 
The executive branch of government in Europe is being transformed in a profound way. We 
are witnessing the development of EU-level executive bodies that, for the first time in the 
history of international organizations, are capable of acting relatively independently of 
member-state governments and councils of ministers. As a consequence, the quite peculiar 
development of the Commission and EU agencies seems to trigger significant centrifugal 
forces within national governments. National agencies are developing into components of 
two administrations: they continue to serve national ministries but also take part in the 
formulation and implementation of EU policies in close cooperation with the Commission or 
EU-level agencies, with relative independence from their respective ministries. The authors 
. . . argue that a genuine Union administration that spans levels of governance is definitely 
in the process of development. 
 
The articulation in the form of a post-Westphalian order, as outlined by Curtin and Egeberg 
(2008), is important also for its normative dimension, as it asserts that effective controls can 
no longer be exercised at either the national or the EU level: 
With the advent of the European Union and its predecessors, Europe’s executive order has 
become qualitatively different from the intergovernmental order inherited from the past. 
We ascribe this phenomenon in particular to the consolidation of the European Commission 
as a new and distinctive executive centre at the European level. This institutional innovation 
triggers significant centrifugal forces within national governments due to the Commission’s 
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strategy of establishing direct partnerships with semi-independent national agencies that 
are crucial for the implementation as well as the formulation of EU policies. The new order 
does not replace former orders; instead it tends to be layered around already existing 
orders so that the result is an increasingly compound and accumulated executive order. 
(Curtin & Egeberg, 2008, p. 639) 
 
Finally, the characterization offered by Hofmann and Turk (2007) is perhaps the most 
radical. They deny the existence of any territorial differentiation or layering. Rather, they 
insist that 
the EU is characterized by its multilevel cooperative governance structures. They are 
designed to include the different decision-making levels and generate knowledge in the 
administrative system prior to taking decisions. This has resulted in the emergence of what 
can be described as a European “integrated administration.” (Hofmann & Turk, 2007, p. X) 
 
The Commission and the EU’s Democratic Credentials 
The Commission features in many, though not all, discussions of the EU’s alleged 
“democratic deficit.” The main questions concern the Commission’s remoteness and 
purported lack of democratic accountability, though some criticisms are based on an 
exaggerated view of its power and influence, misunderstandings of its role within the wider 
EU system, or misrepresentation of its independence. In practice, the Commission only has 
final decision-making authority in competition policy. Elsewhere, it has the ability to 
propose, but decisions are taken by one or more other bodies, usually the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
 
More broadly, as Christiansen (1997) observed more than two decades’ ago, the 
Commission is “multiply accountable,” from its appointment by the European Council and 
approval by the European Parliament, to the possibility of its removal by a censure vote in 
the European Parliament, oversight of its implementing activities through comitology, and 
scrutiny of its financial management by the European Court of Auditors and the European 
Parliament. Regular reporting to Parliament and the Council; undertaking action at the 
behest of the European Council; scrutiny by the media and interest groups; and regulation 
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of its financial management processes and budgetary control through legislative acts, 
adopted by the Council and Parliament, are further mechanisms. 
 
The Commission has featured explicitly in two accounts that suggest that there is no 
democratic deficit—the first, a view associated with Jean Monnet that European integration 
is an essentially technocratic process, led by a small body of experts who, in contrast to self-
serving politicians, will act to advance the long-term welfare of European citizens 
(Featherstone, 1994); and the second, Majone (1994, 1996)’s conceptualization of the EU as 
a “regulatory state,” where the expert staff of non-majoritarian (i.e., unelected) bodies will 
implement efficient policies that advance the common good. 
 
Follesdal and Hix (2005) and Hix (2008) meanwhile contend that a democratic deficit does 
exist in the EU because European citizens do not have the opportunity to “throw the rascals 
out.” Because political contestation and an electoral link between citizens or their 
representatives and decision-makers are minimal conditions for democracy, they propose 
that the Commission president should be elected by national parliaments or nominated by 
the European Parliament. Yet, as well as the concern expressed by Majone (2002b) that 
partisanalizing the Commission president reduces the legitimacy of the Commission because 
the Commission would be identified with a faction or coalition, it is not at all clear, as the 
Spitzenkandidaten process has demonstrated, that an electoral contest is sufficient to 
mobilize EU citizens, increase citizen awareness of EU politics, or encourage domestic 
political contestation about EU policy. 
 
A different approach is taken by Murdoch et al. (2016), who examine the Commission as a 
representative bureaucracy. They focus on the composition of the Commission by 
nationality and compare the beliefs and values of member state nationals in the 
Commission staff with public opinion in their home states. Their analysis reveals an 
alignment of views, which challenges the contention that the Commission is a rootless elite 






The European Commission is the institution that is most closely identified with and 
symbolizes the European Union. Whether or not it is in decline, the Commission’s 
responsibilities, its hybrid structure, and its influence within the EU system and beyond have 
ensured that that organization continues both to attract attention and to divide opinion 
more than five decades after its inception. The functions bestowed on it under the treaties 
ensure that the Commission’s continuous involvement in virtually all EU activities, the 
interaction between the College and the services, and the relationship between the 
Commission president and the other members of the Commission are recast with each new 
administration, and the Commission’s power has fluctuated with the changing inter-
institutional balance. 
 
These properties and the changeability of the environment within which it operates make 
the Commission a fascinating institution. Yet, at the same time, they make it a challenging, 
and sometimes elusive, subject of study. As a result, many misleading accepted wisdoms 
and myths about the Commission and the people who work for it continue to circulate in 
political debate, public discussion, and scholarship. 
 
This leads to three reflections. First, although theorizing about the Commission is 
important—indeed, essential—assumptions, claims, and hypotheses about the organization 
need constant empirical testing. Second, the breadth, scope, and varied character of the 
Commission’s activities and responsibilities suggest a need for caution in generalizing about 
its power and influence. Too often in the literature claims are based on a handful of case 
studies or a very small sample. Third, a continual effort of monitoring and investigation is 
essential, given the Commission’s importance, but also the complexity of the Commission 
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Figure 1. European Commission: Number of nationals among Commission staff relative to 
member state share of EU population. Source: Calculation by Sara Connolly from 




Table 1. European Commission: Staff Composition by Function Group 
 Number Percentage 
Senior manager 353 1% 
Middle manager 1136 4% 
Official AD 11,562 36% 
Official AST 7,844 24% 
Official AST/SC 344 1% 
Temporary staff AD 587 2% 
Temporary staff AST 273 1% 
Temporary staff AST/SC 395 1% 
Contract staff 7,225 22% 
Special adviser 66 0% 
Local staff 2,098 6% 
Staff under national law 516 2% 
Total 32,399 
 
Source: European Commission (2019) HR Key figures: Staff members. 
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Table 2. European Commission: Share of EU Population by Nationality (Percentage); 
Numbers of Commission Staff If Proportionate to Share of EU Population Compared With 
Actual Share of Commission Staff 





Austria 1.73 518 467 
Belgium 2.23 670 4,858 
Bulgaria 1.36 409 744 
Cyprus 0.17 51 145 
Czechia 2.07 622 521 
Germany 16.17 4,850 2,118 
Denmark 1.13 339 355 
Spain 9.14 2,742 2,482 
Estonia 0.26 77 263 
Finland 1.07 322 535 
France 13.05 3,916 3,111 
United Kingdom 12.98 3,894 712 
Greece 2.09 626 1413 
Croatia 0.79 238 339 
Hungary 1.90 571 772 
Ireland 0.96 287 527 
Italy 11.75 3,526 4,058 
Lithuania 0.54 163 430 
Luxembourg 0.12 36 115 
Latvia 0.37 112 374 
Malta 0.10 29 165 
Netherlands 3.37 1,010 615 
Poland 7.40 2,218 1,484 
Portugal 2.00 600 800 
Romania 3.78 1,133 1,357 
Slovakia 1.06 318 435 
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Slovenia 0.41 122 327 
Sweden 1.99 598 527 
 100.00% 29,999  
Source: Calculation by Sara Connolly from European Commission (2019) Statistical Bulletin 
for COMMISSION on 01/10/2019. 
 
 
 
